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A web-based contingent behavior analysis is developed to quantity the effect of both 
negative and positive information treatments and post harvest processes (PHP) on 
demand for oysters. Results from a panel model indicate that consumers of raw and 
cooked oysters behave differently after news of an oyster-related human mortality. While 
cooked oyster consumers take precautionary measures against risk, raw oyster consumers 
exhibit optimistic bias and increase their consumption level. Further, by varying the 
source of a counter-information treatment, we find that source credibility impacts 
behavior. Oyster consumers, and in particular, raw oyster consumers, are most responsive 
to information provided by a not-for-profit, non-governmental organization. Finally, post 
harvest processing of oysters has no impact on demand.  
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Since Shulstad and Stoevener  measured the welfare losses incurred by Oregon 
hunters in reaction to news of mercury contamination in pheasants, research in the food 
safety arena has examined the impact of information conveyance on consumer risk 
perceptions and behavior in the marketplace for a variety of products, including eggs, 
milk, seafood, and beef.
1 One conclusion that can be drawn from the literature is that 
“health scare” information is subjectively evaluated by consumers and is critical to the 
risk perception formation process. In many instances, changes in risk perception can 
cause consumers to react defensively, reducing demand for the product and creating a 
loss in welfare even when there is no scientifically supported health risk from normal 
consumption (Swartz and Strand; Parsons et al.).
2 In other cases, news of health hazards 
has no effect on consumer behavior (Miles and Frewer). In an attempt to explain the 
disparity in findings, researchers identified specific psychological factors that can 
influence consumer behavior and cause consumers to react differently to different 
hazards (Sparks and Shepherd; Shepherd; Miles and Scaife). One prominent factor is that, 
in some instances, individuals exhibit ‘optimistic bias,’ or an unrealistic expectation that 
they are less likely to experience negative events, such as food poisoning, than their 
peers. As such, they avoid any precautionary behavior following news of a health scare 
incident and do not change their behavior. This phenomenon has clear implications for 
information provision of natural hazards, as individuals may ignore risk messages, 
believing the information is directed at someone else.  
Further still, Weinstein and Klein found that information conveying the risks of 
certain health hazards may even exaggerate optimistic bias, leading individuals to 
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consume more of the good in question. Overall, the literature shows that consumer 
reaction to health hazards is idiosyncratic in nature and, as such, it is difficult to predict 
the impact of news of a specific hazard on consumer behavior. Our research adds weight 
to the debate on consumer behavior following a food hazard by examining oyster 
consumer behavior after news of a human mortality associated with oyster consumption. 
We also examine the impact of a counter-information treatment on oyster 
consumer behavior following a health scare incident. Recent research has also attempted 
to quantify the impact of counter-information treatments, designed to reassure consumers 
about a product’s safety, on consumer behavior (see Smith, van Ravenswaay, and 
Thompson; Brown and Schrader; Wessells and Anderson; Parsons et al.). In general, 
these studies find that different positive counter-information treatments have a negligible 
impact on consumer behavior and initial welfare losses, if they exist, persist. For 
example, Parsons et al. examined the welfare effects associated with news of fish kills 
linked to a harmful algae bloom known as Pfiesteria piscicida in Mid-Atlantic estuaries. 
Having estimated aggregate welfare losses of approximately $60 million per month over 
a four-state region, Parsons et al. found that different counter-information treatments had 
no statistical impact on consumer behavior and welfare losses persisted.  
While such research explicitly tests for the impact of different counter-
information treatments on consumer behavior, what is not examined is the role of the 
source, or the provider of information, in reassuring consumers about a product’s safety 
after a health scare incident. In the psychology literature, source credibility has often 
been suggested as a potential cause of the asymmetrical impact of negative and positive 
information provision on consumer behavior (see Hovland and Weiss; Crano; Johnson 
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and Steiner; Sternthal, Lynn, and Dholakia). Generally, this research suggests that more 
credible sources likely induce greater behavioral compliance, as does information that is 
perceived to be incongruous to the best interests of the source.  
Within the agricultural economics literature, the only food safety research that 
considers the role of source credibility in information provision of which the authors are 
aware, is a study that uses a contingent valuation approach to measure consumers’ 
willingness to pay for a seafood inspection program administered by different 
government agencies (Wessells and Anderson). They found that, on average, consumers 
were willing to pay an additional 31 cents per pound of seafood if the product was 
inspected by the National Marine Fisheries Service, 23 cents per pound if administered 
by the Food and Drug Administration, and 22 cents per pound for inspection by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. However, the focus of our research differs as we consider 
source credibility of both a government and not-for-profit organization. Also, we 
explicitly quantify the welfare mitigating effects of different treatment/source 
combinations on consumer behavior.  
There is, however, a growing literature on the role of source information on 
demand for ecolabeling and genetically modified food labels, from which we can derive 
some useful insight. Generally, research in this field suggests that consumers are 
distrusting of information disseminated by government agencies, but demand can be 
influenced if consumers have access to independent, third party information (see 
Milgrom and Roberts; Johnston et al.; Huffman and Tegene; and Huffman et al.). 
The objectives of this paper are three-fold. First, a contingent behavior analysis is 
developed to measure the welfare effects of a hypothetical news release regarding a 
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human mortality from eating raw oysters contaminated with the pathogen Vibrio 
vulnificus (Vibrio v.). Under this scenario, we also test for response differences between 
consumers of raw and cooked oysters. Other research typically looks at all consumers of 
a product, even if they may not be directly linked to the specific contamination incident. 
For example, Parsons et al. examined the behavioral response of consumers of all seafood 
even though Pfiesteria only kills certain species of fish (such as menhaden and mullet). 
Likewise, Swartz and Strand considered the effects of contamination of the James River, 
Virginia, on demand for oysters in the Baltimore market, even though oysters harvested 
in the James River are not sold in Baltimore. Essentially, after news of the health scare, 
perceived risk of consuming the product can elevate even though the actual risk may be 
negligible or even zero. We follow this research by examining the effects of a health 
scare on all oyster consumers’ (both raw and cooked) behavior. However, as Vibrio v. 
only affects consumers of raw oysters with specific health conditions, we also examine 
the marginal effects of news of an oyster-related health hazard on consumers of raw 
oysters.   
Second, we examine behavioral responses after providing consumers with expert 
counter-information, reassuring individuals about oyster consumption safety. At this 
stage, the impact of the information provider (source) on oyster demand is evaluated by 
varying the source of the counter-information treatment across respondents. Identifying 
the effectiveness of an information treatment on consumer behavior, varied by source, 
may well provide important policy-based information as the oyster industry and 
state/federal agencies seek direction for future consumer educational outreach programs. 
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Again, by differentiating between raw and cooked oyster consumers, we examine the 
marginal effects of our counter-information treatment on raw oyster consumers.  
Finally, because previous research suggests that consumers tend to respond 
favorably to inspection programs that guarantee a product’s quality, the impact of a 
generic post-harvest process (PHP) oyster treatment and related price premiums on 
consumer behavior is also examined.
3  
 
Background - Vibrio vulnificus 
Vibrio v. is a gram-negative bacterium found naturally in warm, brackish, coastal 
waters, such as the Gulf of Mexico. It is found in higher concentrations in the summer 
months when coastal waters are warm and filter-feeding shellfish, including oysters, 
concentrate Vibrio v. in their tissues. Consumption of Vibrio v.-contaminated raw oysters 
by individuals with certain health conditions can cause life threatening illnesses, the most 
common of which is acute septicemia or blood poisoning. Those most at risk are 
individuals that suffer from various health conditions such as liver disease, iron overload 
disease, diabetes, cancer, or a weakened immune system. Risk of life threatening illness 
from consuming oysters arises primarily if the oysters are consumed raw or in an 
undercooked state. While healthy individuals have little life threatening infection risk 
from eating shellfish, those that are at risk can avoid infection by eating only shellfish 
that have been thoroughly cooked or processed to reduce Vibrio v. to non-detectable 
levels and by avoiding contact with seawater. In some instances Vibrio v.-related illness 
can lead to death; however, reported incidences of Vibrio v.-related illnesses are 
infrequent. To put it in perspective, an Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference (ISSC) 
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educational brochure states that of the millions of oyster meals consumed each year in the 
U.S., the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recorded only 341 Vibrio v.-related 
serious illnesses over a 14-year period from 1989 through 2002. Of the 341 cases, 98% 
were associated with consumption of raw oysters, of which 179 cases resulted in death. 
Corcoran also documents that each year more than 50 at-risk people become ill, of which, 
at least 10 individuals die from eating uncooked Gulf Coast oysters contaminated with 
Vibrio v. bacteria. 
Oyster consumers’ understanding of Vibrio v. risk and the impact on consumer 
marketplace behavior is a major concern for the oyster industry and relevant state and 
federal agencies.  Heightened consumer perceptions of risk and misconceptions about 
how to reduce and manage the risk of Vibrio v. infection from oyster consumption are 
widespread. These perceptual issues and FDA mandates resulted in the development and 
implementation of educational and outreach programs to better inform consumers about 
the risks associated with Vibrio v. and research associated with these efforts has become 
a priority for state and federal regulatory agencies, as well as industry stakeholders. For 
example, the Florida Vibrio v. Risk Reduction Plan for Oysters states “The State of 
Florida believes that consumer education is the first and foremost tool to reduce illness 
related to Vibrio vulnificus” (Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 
Division of Aquaculture). 
  
Survey and Study Design 
We developed a web-based contingent behavior analysis to measure the welfare 
effects associated with news of an oyster-related human mortality. We then measured the 
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mitigating impacts of providing a consumer educational brochure (varied by source) and 
a PHP treatment and related price premium on individuals’ demand for oyster meals.  
The population of interest was defined as adults (aged 18 and over) who reside in 
a household in the state of Florida with a telephone and have access to the internet.  Some 
consumer-focused oyster product studies have limited consumer samples to a small 
number of core production/consumption states (e.g., Flattery and Bashin, who sampled 
California, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas households), while others have sampled 
nationally (e.g., Hanson et al.).  A Florida sample was used in order to focus on major 
markets for the Apalachicola, Florida oyster industry. A probability sample plan known 
in the marketing research industry as an “RDD sample” was used.  In this sample plan, a 
commercial research list vendor generates a list of randomly selected telephone numbers 
to provide a representative sample of the state population.  
Data collection was performed in two rounds. Round 1 was a telephone survey, 
administered at the time of initial telephone contact by the commercial market research 
firm. The round 1 survey instrument was designed to elicit pre-treatment baseline data for 
oyster consumption experience, attitudes, and preferences; reasons for consumption or 
non-consumption; awareness and perceptions of oyster consumption health risk; 
knowledge about oyster consumption health risk; and relevant demographic data. For use 
in estimation, we also asked respondents whether they consume raw or cooked oysters, or 
both. In addition, following Parsons et al., in order to calculate welfare estimates, 
respondents were also asked how their monthly oyster meals consumed would change if 
the price of an oyster meal were to rise.
4  
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At the end of the telephone survey, respondents were asked if they would be 
willing to participate in the second round of the survey, administered through the project 
website. Two to three days after completion of their round 1 telephone interviews, 
respondents agreeing to participate in round 2 received an email containing instructions 
to follow a provided link to the project website for completion of the round 2 
experiment.
5 When entering the project web site, respondents were asked to confirm that 
they participated in the round 1 telephone study. Non-participants in round 1 were logged 
out with the message to please ask the actual respondent in their household to click into 
the site. Qualified respondents saw instructions for completing the survey and were asked 
if they had heard or seen additional information about oyster safety since their round 1 
participation.  The focus of round 2 was to ask respondents a series of contingent 
behavior questions regarding their oyster consumption having been subject to the 
counter-information/source treatment.  
As a reference point for these future contingent behavior questions, respondents 
were asked an initial revealed preference question regarding their average number of 
oyster meals eaten in a typical month.
6  Respondents were then guided through the survey 
instrument where they were presented with each information treatment followed by a 
contingent behavior question regarding how their expected monthly meals consumed 
would change. It should be noted that individuals that responded to both surveys were 
asked to report their baseline consumption levels twice. Changes from baseline levels due 
to price changes in round 1 of the survey were used to measure the slope of the oyster 
demand function. Changes from baseline levels in round 2 were used to measure the 
shifts in demand due to the news and counter-information treatments. This can impact 
10  
consumer surplus estimates as respondents could change their stated baseline levels 
between rounds. For example, respondents that report different baseline levels in round 1 
alter the slope of their demand function, which will filter through to our absolute welfare 
measures. However, the focus of the research is on the relative magnitude of the shifts in 
demand after the different information treatments. As all shifts are measured with respect 
to the same base in expected meals, the relative magnitudes of the shifts, and therefore 
the relative changes in consumer surplus will not be altered.  
Respondents were first asked to read a fictitious newspaper article (modeled on a 
sample of actual publications) regarding the death of a Texas man as a result of eating 
raw oysters. A contingent behavior question then asked respondents how they would 
change their monthly oyster consumption if the death reported in the press release were to 
occur. Specifically, respondents were asked: 
“Thinking about oyster meals again, suppose that the average price of your oyster 
meals stays the same.  Compared to the [number]
7 oyster meals you previously 
told us you eat in a typical month, do you think you will eat more, less, or about 
the same number of oyster meals in the next month that you eat oysters after 
learning about the recent death in the article you just read?” 
Respondents were then asked to quantify how many more or less meals depending on 
their answer. 
Next, respondents were shown an image of a tri-fold color pamphlet, currently 
produced by the ISSC, as an educational brochure providing the pertinent facts 
concerning the actual risks associated with Vibrio v. and oyster consumption, as well as 
information on the specific human health conditions necessary to be at risk, and a 
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reiteration that only consumption of raw oysters poses a risk to human health. By survey 
design, the source of the educational brochure was randomly varied across respondents. 
Before being presented with the brochure, respondents were provided with textual 
material stating both the source of information and its mission. Also, when subjected to 
the brochure, the source was again clearly identified. Source 1 was a government 
associated set of organizations – specifically, the Interstate Shellfish Sanitary Conference 
(ISSC)/Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Source 2 was a researcher-created 
fictitious Vibrio v. education program “brand identity” (“The American Shellfish 
Foundation”) developed as a proxy for a not-for-profit, non-governmental organization 
whose mission is to promote the production of safe shellfish products and to support 
educational and prevention programs for shellfish-related disease and other health risks. 
The third source treatment level was not sourced to any agency or organization and 
provided a control condition. Respondents were then asked how the counter-
information/source treatment would change their monthly oyster consumption behavior. 
The impact of PHP oysters was examined by exposing respondents to textual 
material containing non-technical educational information about the concept and efficacy 
of various types of PHP treatments to mitigate the risk of Vibrio v. infection. Essentially, 
there are four PHP systems approved by the FDA – pressurization, pasteurization, 
freezing, and irradiation. All PHP systems are designed to reduce Vibrio v. bacteria in 
oysters to non-detectable levels. Also, PHP systems kill spoilage bacteria, extending the 
shelf life and maintaining the freshness and quality of oysters. As a result, PHP systems 
have the potential to reduce consumers’ perceived risk of Vibrio v.-related illnesses and 
to create significant welfare gains. After being provided information about the efficacy of 
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PHP treatments, respondents were again asked how their anticipated oyster consumption 
would change.  
Finally, respondents were informed that adoption of PHP procedures would likely 
result in a price increase for the typical oyster meal. By survey design, respondents were 
randomly assigned one of four price premiums
8 and were asked for the final time how 
their oyster consumption would change relative to their initial quantity consumed.  
 
Data  
In the round 1 telephone survey phase of the study, 3,444 eligible potential 
respondents were contacted, with 615 (a 17.8% base response rate) agreeing to participate 
and completing the telephone data collection process.
9  Of that base, 368 respondents 
(59.8%) identified themselves as oyster consumers and 435 (70.8%) indicated that 
internet access was available to them.  Of the 368 oyster consumers, 340 (a 92.4% 
conversion rate) agreed to participate in the round 2, web-based portion of the study.  Of 
those agreeing to participate in round 2, 103 (a 30.3% conditional response rate) actually 
logged into the study website after initial notification and one reminder and completed 
the experimental procedure. There were 24 incomplete responses leaving 79 usable 
observations (23.2 % response rate) for the panel model. The modest sample of oyster 
consumers for the model is a function, primarily of the difficulty in contacting 
respondents willing to participate in the survey process, and in particular, oyster 
consumers.  
Tables 1 and 2 provide definitions and descriptive statistics for the variables 
collected in the survey and used in the analysis.  Several meal count characteristics 
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immediately stand out.  First, respondents consume, on average, 2.24 oyster meals in a 
typical month. The average number of oyster meals respondents expect to consume then 
decreases to 2.14 following news of an oyster-related human mortality. Average expected 
meals then vary depending on the counter-information/source and PHP treatments. 
Finally, 94% of the sample was Caucasian, 42% were male, average household income 
was $76,000, and there were 2.5 people per home. 
Insert Table 1 and 2 here 
 
Estimation Methodology 
In estimation, an oyster-related human mortality is treated as a factor influencing 
an individual’s perceived risk of oyster consumption, which, in turn, has an influence on 
an individual’s demand for oysters. Over a fixed time period, an oyster consumer’s 
indirect utility function can be expressed as 
(1)              )) ( , , , , ( h r s y q p v v =
where p is the price of an oyster meal, q is the price of a composite of all other goods, y is 
an individual’s income over the relevant time period, s is a vector of socio-demographic 
variables believed to influence the demand for oysters, and r is the perceived quality of 
oysters as a function of a vector of attributes that influence this perception, where hi is 
one of i elements in the vector r. Elements in h pertain to the hypothetical information 
treatments associated with an oyster-related human mortality used in the contingent 
behavior application of the survey design. Specifically,  
(2)          prem php php nfp broc issc broc cont broc news h _ , , _ , _ , _ , =
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where news is a binary variable representing a fictitious newspaper article regarding a 
human death related to consuming raw oysters, broc_cont, broc_issc, and broc_nfp are 
binary variables representing a color tri-fold brochure regarding the safety of oyster 
consumption with no provided source (control group), sourced to the ISSC/FDA, and 
sourced to a not-for-profit organization, respectively. Finally, php_prem is the price 
premium placed on a generic post-harvest processing treatment, php. 
By Roy’s identity, the uncompensated demand function for oyster meals can be 
expressed as 
(3)    
   
   
Following Parsons et al., linear forms for r(h) and x(p,q,y,s,r(h)) were used to 
estimate oyster demand and the impact of an oyster-related human mortality and 
additional information treatments on demand. 
The basic linear model can be written as 
(4)             )) ( , , , , , ( h r SP s y q p f x =
where an individual’s number of actual/expected oyster meals consumed (x), is a function 
of the explanatory variables. Within the stated preference literature, research has shown 
that values for non-market goods derived from stated preference survey techniques often 
exceed revealed values (List and Gallet; Murphy et al.). Therefore, we also included a 
stated preference elicitation dummy, SP, to account for and measure any hypothetical 
bias present in the stated preference meal counts (Egan and Herriges; Whitehead). 
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  As the dependent variable is a nonnegative integer with a high frequency of 
small numbers, a linear count data specification was investigated in an attempt to 
estimate the relationship between information treatments and demand for oysters.
10 The 
Poisson model is typically used to study data of this nature. However, a critical and 
limiting assumption of the Poisson model is that the conditional mean of the dependent 
variable, λ, equals the conditional mean, that is, the variance-mean ratio is unity. This is a 
restricting assumption as count data often exhibit overdispersion of the population with 
the variance greater than the mean, giving a variance-mean ratio greater than one. As 
such, overdispersion is a form of heterogeneity. A less restrictive model is the negative 
binomial model, which is a generalized version of the Poisson model and estimates an 
additional overdispersion parameter. It has been shown that as the dispersion goes to 
zero, the negative binomial model approaches the Poisson distribution (Agresti). As the 
Poisson model is a special case of the negative binomial model, a standard likelihood 
ratio test can be used to compare the models.  
Following Haab and McConnell the appropriate negative binomial model 
probability function with a gamma distributed error term in the mean for an individual 
can be expressed as 























































               
where Γ denotes a gamma distribution, α is the overdispersion parameter, and the 
parameter, λ, is the expected number of meals consumed and is assumed to be a function 
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of the variables specified in the model. Usually, λ takes a log-linear form to ensure 
nonnegative meals and may be written as 
(6)  
SP prem php php nfp broc
issc broc cont broc news
house race gend inc q p
SP prem php php nfp broc
issc broc cont broc news
house race gend inc q p
β β β β
β β β
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where the β’s are the coefficients to be estimated.  
Pooling the data suggests that a panel data model be used to account for 
differences in variance across individuals and consumption choice scenarios. That is, we 
recognize that there are likely unobserved individual specific factors that are correlated 
across respondents’ five responses. We estimate a balanced negative binomial panel 
model with random effects to allow the error term in the model to be correlated across 
consumption choice scenarios for each individual.
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Using the estimated coefficients, a welfare measure, or consumer surplus, is 
calculated under each information treatment. Consumer surplus represents a measure that 
the individual places on monthly oyster meals consumed and is estimated as the 
difference between total willingness to pay for a typical oyster meal and the price of a 
meal. From the linear model, consumer surplus per meal is calculated as 





1       
where βp is the coefficient on the price of an oyster meal. Consumer surplus estimates 
after the information treatments were calculated using the relevant independent variable. 
The effect of an independent variable on the per meal consumer surplus is  






= Δ        
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where θ is the coefficient on the independent variable.  
  
Results 
Results from the negative binomial models with random effects are presented in 
Table 3. We estimate three versions of the model. Model 1 is the basic model as 
described in Equation (6). We also provide two interactive models. In Model 2, we test 
whether the change in demand after news of a Vibrio v.-related health scare differs for 
raw oyster consumers by adding an interaction term (news_raw). Model 2 is formally 
written as 
(9)       raw news SP
prem php php nfp broc
issc broc cont broc news
house race gend inc q p
raw news SP
prem php php nfp broc
issc broc cont broc news
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where βnews_rawnews_raw is the marginal effect on demand of raw oyster consumers due 
to news of a Vibrio v.-related health scare. Recall, by survey design, we ask respondents 
whether they eat raw or cooked oysters, or both, so we can isolate the behavior of 
consumers of the product specific to the health scare. Finally, Model 3 examines the 
impact of the counter-information treatment sourced to the not-for-profit organization on 
raw oyster consumers. The model is given by
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where βnfp_rawnfp_raw is the marginal effect on demand of raw oyster consumers due to 
the counter-information treatment sourced to the not-for-profit organization. 
In each model, the positive and significant alpha value indicates that 
overdispersion is present in the data, suggesting that the standard errors in a Poisson 
model will be underestimated and the negative binomial model is the more appropriate of 
the two.  
Insert Table 3 
Table 4 contains the consumer surplus estimates from all three models associated 
with an oyster meal plus the change in consumer surplus associated with the counter-
information/source and PHP treatments. In calculating our consumer surplus 
measurements, we follow Parsons et al. and present all estimates on a per meal basis. 
While our consumer surplus measures provide a useful quantification of the behavioral 
responses due to the news and counter-information treatments, they do require some 
limiting assumptions. Primarily, we do not account for substitution effects. As consumers 
seek to maximize utility, after news of the health scare, impacted consumers likely switch 
to a (perceived) relatively less risky option. Failure to account for substitution means that 
our estimates likely provide an upper bound on the decrease in welfare due to news of the 
health scare. Also, the contingent behavior nature of the analysis does not account for 
temporal effects. Other market data research finds that changes in welfare may be short-
lived in the absence of frequent message repetition (e.g., Dahlgran and Fairchild; Piggot 
and Marsh). As such, our welfare effects are short term and may diminish over time.  
Insert Table 4 
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The basic panel model (Model 1) results produced several findings worthy of 
note. First, the average consumer surplus estimate for an oyster meal is approximately 
$11 per meal.  
Next, the price coefficient is, as expected, negative and significant indicating a 
downward sloping oyster demand curve as consumers behave in line with conventional 
economic theory.  
All socio-demographic variables are significant at the five percent level. The 
negative coefficient on inc suggests that higher income earning individuals consume less 
oysters, so oysters are an inferior good. This finding is supported by Hanson et al. in their 
2000-2001 survey of oyster consumer opinions and preferences in which they found that 
the highest probability of consuming oysters occurred in the lowest income group. Other 
consumer characteristic variables indicate that there is a statistically significant difference 
in the gender and race of oyster consumers with white males more likely to consume 
oysters. Also, household size is important as larger households consume more oysters.  
The stated preference elicitation dummy, SP, is positive but not significant across 
models, implying that stated preference elicitation does not have an effect on demand in 
the contingent behavior framework. 
Turning to the experimental information treatments, in our basic model, a major 
finding of interest is that the news coefficient is negative but not significant, so news of a 
human mortality associated with oyster consumption has no effect on demand. This could 
suggest that the oyster consumers sampled exhibit optimistic bias, believing that they are 
less likely to experience health problems associated with their consumption of oysters 
than others. As such, news of a health scare does not change behavior. In this case, we 
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argue that any optimistic bias may not be without cause. Some research has illustrated 
that optimistic bias can be associated with increased attention to risk information (Taylor 
and Brown; Armor and Taylor). Perhaps oyster consumers are fully informed about the 
minimal risks of consuming the product, and that the risks are already factored into the 
consumption decision. As such, new health scare information does not alter risk 
perceptions, and so, behavior does not change. This effect is in contrast to other food 
safety health scares that can act as exogenous shocks to the demand function. For 
example, salmonella risks from consuming tomatoes or Pfiesteria-related fish kills are 
likely to be generally unknown risks prior to media coverage, and as such, news of 
contamination can have a significant effect on behavior.    
We further examine this issue by testing whether consumers of raw oysters 
respond differently to the news treatment than consumers of cooked oysters. 
Interestingly, in Model 2, the news_raw coefficient is positive and significant, indicating 
that raw oyster consumers are more inclined to increase their consumption after a health 
scare event relative to cooked oyster consumers. This provides useful insight into the 
contrasting behavior of our two groups. While results suggest that consumers of cooked 
oysters are more risk averse (perhaps explaining why they cook their oysters), and take 
precautionary measures to protect against any potential risk, it is raw oyster consumers 
that exhibit optimistic bias behavior. The finding that raw oyster consumers are more 
likely to respond positively to the news release is supported by research that indicates 
information conveying the risks of certain health hazards can exaggerate optimistic bias, 
leading individuals to increase their consumption (Weinstein and Klein). In terms of the 
consumer surplus results, the increase in per meal welfare incurred by raw oyster 
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consumers ($3.60) almost completely offsets the decrease in per meal welfare ($4.12) of 
all our sampled consumers after the news release. 
Next, the effects of counter-information, designed to reassure oyster consumers 
about the safety of oysters, was examined using the educational brochure treatments 
broc_cont, broc_issc, and broc_nfp. Previous research indicated that positive information 
treatments do not have a counteracting influence of reassuring consumers about a 
product’s safety following a health scare incident (Parsons et al.; Brown and Schrader). 
However, earlier food safety research did not allow for variation in source in the 
provision of information treatments. By varying the educational brochure by source, the 
effectiveness of different educational treatment/source combinations in mitigating initial 
welfare losses was tested. Recall that respondents were informed of the source of the 
counter-information and its logo was clearly identified on the brochure itself. In Model 1, 
the insignificant coefficient on broc_cont suggests that counter-information with no 
identified source has no statistical impact on demand, supporting the findings of previous 
research that expert risk opinion has little impact on consumer behavior. This result also 
holds for counter-information sourced to the ISSC/FDA (broc_issc), indicating that 
respondents perhaps deem the message to be in the interests of the government agency, 
and as such, the message is discounted. However, when the counter-information is 
sourced to a not-for-profit organization (“The American Shellfish Foundation”), results 
suggest this treatment/source combination has an effect on increasing demand for oyster 
meals.
12 The size of the broc_nfp coefficient is also important. The positive effect of the 
counter-information sourced to the not-for-profit organization increases per meal 
consumer surplus by approximately $2.87.  
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This result has important policy-based implications. As the oyster industry, the 
ISSC, and other agencies continue efforts to develop consumer education strategies 
relating to consumer awareness of oyster safety and Vibrio v., these findings suggest that 
source credibility is an important component in the efficacy of educational treatments. 
The results here indicate that consumers may perceive not-for-profit organizations as 
more credible sources of information, and as such, have a greater impact on consumer 
safety reassurance associated with oyster consumption.  
Again, we test whether raw oyster consumers behave differently, this time, due to 
the counter-information treatment sourced to a not-for-profit organization.
13 Results from 
Model 3 suggest that it is the consumers of raw oysters that are the most responsive, 
significantly increasing their demand for oysters after the information treatment from a 
trusted source. Again, we believe optimistic bias plays a role. Other research indicates 
that optimistic bias is present in individual behavior for hazards where consumers can 
identify with a prominent “at risk” individual (Miles and Scaife). Perhaps the treatment 
reaffirms that only individuals with specific health conditions are at risk from consuming 
raw oysters, therefore, the brochure and trusting source encourages further consumption 
for consumers of raw oysters.  
Finally, php is negative and insignificant suggesting that consumers do not 
respond favorably to a PHP-treated oyster. One potential reason is that, unlike seafood 
inspection programs that guarantee a product’s safety, PHPs actually treat the oyster to 
reduce the Vibrio v. bacteria to non-detectable levels. As such, the treatment may affect 
the taste and texture of the product, producing, in the opinion of some consumers, an 
inferior product. This has important policy implications for oyster processing companies 
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that invest substantial funds into PHP equipment as our findings suggest that a treated 
oyster has no impact on demand. Finally, to further support the argument that consumers 
do not favor PHP treatments, a treated oyster with an associated price premium has a 
significant effect on reducing demand.  
 
Conclusion 
A web-based contingent behavior analysis of oyster consumers is developed to 
quantify changes in consumer behavior as a result of news of an oyster-related human 
mortality and a counter-information and generic PHP treatment. We find that consumers 
of raw oysters and cooked oysters behave differently after the news release. We posit that 
raw oyster consumers exhibit optimistic bias, believing that they are not susceptible to the 
risks associated with oyster consumption. This belief may be a function of being fully 
informed about the actual risks of consuming raw oysters. As such, new information of 
an oyster-related health scare does not change their behavior. In contrast, consumers of 
cooked oysters are more risk averse, taking precautionary measures to protect themselves 
against potential risk after a press release. 
Further, while previous research finds that, generally, counter-information has 
little impact on consumer behavior, the impact of source credibility in information 
provision has not been tested. By varying counter-information treatments by source, we 
find that a treatment sourced to a not-for-profit, non-governmental organization 
significantly increases demand for oyster meals following news of an oyster-related 
human mortality. As a result, consumers’ per meal welfare increases by approximately 
$2.90. Again, we find that it is raw oyster consumers that are the most responsive, 
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increasing their demand for oysters following the brochure treatment, suggesting that the 
information reaffirms their opinion that they are not at risk from their consumption 
behavior.   
Our findings do suggest that the oyster industry, ISSC, and other government 
agencies should consider the role of source credibility in future consumer education 
strategies to optimize the impact of informational treatments on consumer behavior. 
Finally, we also find that a treated oyster has no impact on demand and that further 
investigation within the oyster industry on the impacts of different PHP treatments is 
warranted. 
We believe that our research and findings provide a significant contribution to the 
food safety literature and offer important policy-based findings for industry and state 
governments involved in developing consumer education treatments and outreach 
programs. We also hope that it provides a base for future research to examine the role of 
source in consumer education treatments. Based on our results, we intend to expand the 
sample size in experimental treatments to a larger survey of oyster producing state and 















1.   For example, Swartz and Strand analyzed the impact of news associated with the 
prohibition of harvesting oysters in the James River, Virginia, on the demand for 
oysters in the Baltimore market; Smith, van Ravenswaay, and Thompson 
measured the impact of milk ban news on the demand for milk in Hawaii; Brown 
and Schrader investigated the effects of cholesterol media coverage on the 
demand for eggs; Wessells and Anderson analyzed the impact of news about 
domoic acid contamination of mussels on the demand for mussels; and Miles and 
Frewer examined the impacts of news of “Mad Cow” disease on the demand for 
beef in the UK. 
 
2.  Swartz and Strand termed the welfare losses associated with decreased 
consumption “avoidance costs.” 
 
3.  Parsons et al. found that a mandatory seafood inspection program had a 
significant positive effect on seafood demand. 
 
4.  By survey design, respondents are randomly presented with a price increase of $1, 
$3, $5, or $7. 
 
5.  Each link contained an unobtrusive identifier code specific to the individual, 
allowing round 1 telephone and round 2 web data to be matched for each research 
participant. 
 
6.  Respondents were told that an oyster meal can be eaten either in their home or in 
restaurants and include meals where their main course was oysters, meals when 
oysters were an important ingredient in a dish like gumbo, or meals where they 
ate just an oyster appetizer. 
 
7.  As part of the web-based survey, the baseline stated number of oyster meals 
consumed in a typical month is automatically inserted into the text. 
 
8.  The price premiums associated with the implementation of PHP procedures are 
randomly assigned as either $1, $3, $5, or $7. 
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9.  Eligible for participation means the respondent lived in Florida and was over the 
age of 18. This includes both oyster consumers and non-consumers. 
 
10.  See Creel and Loomis and Hellerstein for a full discussion of count data models. 
 
11.  In estimation, there are 79 usable observations for each of the six stacked 
equations, giving a total of 474 observations for use in the model. 
 
12.  This result supports findings in the ecolabeling research arena (for example, 
Milgrom and Roberts, Johnston et al., Huffman and Tegene, and Huffman et al.) 
that suggests consumers are more trusting of independent, third party, 
information. 
 
13.  As only the counter-information treatment sourced to the not-for-profit 
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Number of oyster meals consumed in a month 
 
Q_price  Number of oyster meals respondents expect to consume in a 
month following a price increase  
 
Q_news  Number of oyster meals respondents expect to consume in a 
month following news of an oyster-related human mortality 
 
Q_cont  Number of oyster meals respondents expect to consume in a 
month having read the counter-information brochure with no 
source (control group) 
 
Q_issc  Number of oyster meals respondents expect to consume in a 
month having read the counter-information brochure, sourced to 
the ISSC/FDA 
 
Q_nfp  Number of oyster meals respondents expect to consume in a 
month having read the counter-information brochure, sourced to 
“The American Shellfish Foundation” – a not-for-profit 
organization 
 
Q_php  Number of oyster meals respondents expect to consume in a 
month assuming the oysters have been treated with a generic 
PHP 
 
Q_php_prem  Number of oyster meals respondents expect to consume in a 
month assuming the oysters have been treated with a generic 
PHP, plus a price premium 
 
Inc  Household income of respondent ($1,000s) 
 
Gend  Dummy variable – Male =1, 0 otherwise  
 
Race  Dummy variable – White =1, 0 otherwise  
 
House  Total number of people living in respondent’s house  
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Deviation Min Max
Q_typical 2.24  1.78  1.00 12.00
Q_price 1.87  1.94  0.00 12.00
Q_news 2.14  1.82  0.00 12.00
Q_cont 1.95  1.10  1.00 5.00
Q_issc 2.37  2.21  1.00 12.00
Q_nfp 2.68  1.89  0.00 8.00
Q_php 2.10  1.86  0.00 12.00
Q_php_prem 1.61  1.87  0.00 12.00
Inc 76.49  38.65  15.00 150.00
Gend 0.42  0.50  0.00 1.00
Race 0.94  0.24  0.00 1.00




Table 3.  Negative Binomial Model with Random Effects 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error 
Price  -0.094** 0.036 -0.094** 0.036 -0.093** 0.036 
Inc  -0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
Gend  0.219** 0.083 0.190** 0.082 0.201** 0.082 
Race  0.170** 0.047 0.194** 0.043 0.181** 0.044 
House  0.220** 0.023 0.219** 0.022 0.221** 0.022 
News  -0.183 0.165  -0.387**  0.190 -0.181 0.162 
Broc_cont  -0.057 0.263 -0.064 0.246 -0.051 0.259 
Broc_issc 0.048 0.158 0.039 0.159 0.052 0.153 
Broc_nfp 0.272* 0.161 0.294* 0.167  0.059  0.189 
PHP  -0.328 0.363 -0.327 0.354 -0.358 0.361 
PHP_prem  -0.047** 0.020 -0.026** 0.020 -0.049** 0.021 
News_raw     0.338**  0.113    
Nfp_raw       0.389**  0.134 
SP  0.039 0.158 0.026 0.154 0.030 0.155 
Alpha  0.078**  0.038 0.066* 0.038 0.069* 0.038 
Log  Lik.  -798.99  -792.02  -793.58  
R
2  0.09  0.09  0.09  
Obs.  474  474  474  
* Significant at 10% level. 




Table 4.  Consumer Surplus per Meal Estimates 
 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3 
CS per Meal  $10.64  $10.64  $10.75 
∆CS – News  -$1.95  -$4.12  -$1.95 
∆CS – Broc_cont  -$0.61  -$0.68  -$0.54 
∆CS – Broc_issc  $0.51  $0.41  $0.55 
∆CS – Broc_nfp  $2.87  $3.13  $0.63 
∆CS – PHP  -$3.49  -$3.48  -$3.81 
∆CS – PHP_prem  -$0.50  -$0.28  -$0.52 
∆CS – News_raw    $3.60   
∆CS – Nfp_raw      $4.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 